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RECENT CASES
Master and Servant-Workmen's Compensation-Course of Em.
ployment. It had been the custom of P and many of his fellow-workers to
bring their lunches from home and eat the noon meal in the employer's plant.
During a lunch period, an airplane, being operated by D's agent, crashed into
the plant, injuring P P sought to recover from D on a negligent injury claim.
The trial court sustained D's contention that P's only remedy was under the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Rm. Ryv. STAT., § 7673 et seq.). Held.
Reversed. Not having been injured in the course of his employment, P did
not come within the compensation act and could maintain hIs common law
action for negligence. utti v. Boeing Aircraft Co., 125 Wash. Dec. 811,
172 P.(2d) 249 (1946).
In many jurisdictions, an injured workman is entitled to the benefits of
the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries received on the employer's
premises, although the accident occurred during the lunch hour, where the
eating of the lunch on the premises was with the employer's knowledge and
consent, 6 A. L. R. 1151 (1920), particularly, under laws similar to the
Washington act. See 15 WAsH. L. REv. 120 (1940). This result is based on
the view that the employee is performing services growing out of, and in-
cidental to, his employment.
On its first occasion to pass on the noon hour problem, the Washington
court recognized that a workman, injured at that time, might be allowed re-
covery, but denied the application of the compensation act because the par-
ticular injury resulted from an act of the employee's own conception, having
nothing to do with his work or meal. Young v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
200 Wash. 138, 93 P.(2d) 337, 123 A. L. R. 1171 (1939). The next time
the problem arose, the rule announced under the peculiar facts of the Young
case was understood to control the general situation. The court held that
since during the noon hour the employee is not under the control of the
employer, nor is he furthering any interest of the employer, any injury he
sustained at that time is not within the course of Is employment. D'Amico v.
Congutsta, 124 Wash. Dec. 640, 167 P.(2d) 157 (1946). The court defined
the conditions under which an injured workman is entitled to the benefits of
the compensation act. First, the relationship of employer and employee must
exist between the injured person and his employer (except in some cases
where the injured person is an independent contractor), second, the injured
man must be in the course of his employment; third, the employee must be in
the actual performance of the duties required by the contract of employment;
and fourth, the work being done must be such as to require the payment of
industrial insurance premiums or assessments. The facts of the D'Aimico case
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were found to have met none of the last three conditions, and in the instant
case the court reached a similar finding.
The Washington Workmen's Compensation Act has been construed to
cover injuries incurred while the employee is going to and coming from work
m transportation furnished by the employer. Pearson v. Aluminum Co. of
Amertca, 23 Wn.(2d) 403, 161 P.(2d) 169 (1945). Such transportation was
considered as "incidental to the employment." A similar approach to injuries
during the noon rest period would be in accord with general holdings in other
jurisdictions. W.J.D.
Property-Tax Lien Duration-Statutes of Lamitations. The State
of Washington filed a tax warrant against M in 1936 for failure to pay taxes
assessed under the Occupation and Sales Tax Act of 1935 and acquired a lien
against all real and personal property held by him. REM. REv STAT., § 8370-
202. M acquired title to realty in 1941 and P derived his title to this land from
him in 1945. P asks judgment that the State of Washington has lost its lien on
the realty Judgment for P D appeals. Held. Affirmed. The state's lien
expired six years after the entry of the warrant in the judgment docket since
such warrant is the same as a judgment in a civil case. Hutton v. State, 136
Wash. Dec. 378, 171 P.(2d) 248 (1946).
This is a case of first impression. It is a recognized rule of statutory con-
struction that effect should be accorded to every part of the act and that that
construction is favored which will render every word operative. 50 Am. JUt.,
Statutes, § 358. REM. Rzv. STAT., § 8370-202 provides:
"The amount of such warrant shall become a lien upon the title to
real property of the taxpayer and shall be the same as a judgment in a
civil case."
The legislature expressly adopted by reference the general law dealing with
limitations upon civil judgments. State v. Rasmussen, 14 Wn.(2d) 397, 128
P.(2d) 318 (1942), 25 R. C. L. § 160. A judgment constitutes a lien against
the real estate of the judgment debtor for six years from date of entry Rla.
REV. STAT., § 445. Therefore, it follows that after the expiration of six years,
such tax warrant ceased to be a lien against the realty Normally, a state is
immune from general statutes of limitations. REM. REv. STAT., § 167 How-
ever, such time durations as applied in the instant case are not mere statutes
of limitations procedual in their nature but rather are positive limitations on
substantive rights unknown at common law. Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414,
14 N.E.(2d) 478 (1938), 2 FREEmA., JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2108,
§ 1013.
There is a seeming contrariety of opinion as to whether statutes limiting the
life of judgment liens operate against the Federal and State Goverments.
Federal courts have repeatedly held that the rights of the United States can-
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not be impaired by the lapse of time provided as a bar by the laws of the
states. United States v. Mhnor, 235 F 101 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). Kansas,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania and Virgima follow this view as to state immunity
with Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Utah and West Virginia arrayed
on the opposite side. 118 A. L. R. 929.. The Washington court seems to have
stepped into line with a slim majority
This problem is not presented by other Washington tax acts as each of the
others provide for definite time durations without reference to judgment liens.
Gift tax liens last expressly ten years. RPm. REv. STAT. § 11218-20. Inheri-
tance tax liens for six years. RPr. REv. STAT., § 11202-1 j. The taxation lien
statutes on forests and forest lands use no qualifying language. REm. REv.
STAT., § 11219-29 Liens for payment of both real and personal property
taxes continue "until the same are paid." REm. REv. STAT., § 11265. Finally,
unemployment compensation tax liens, REm. REv. STAT. § 9998-231, and
those for used fuel taxes, REm. REv. STAT., § 8327-38, are inextinguishable
without payment. P M. R.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 33-Power of Trial
Judge to Grant New Trial After Appeal Taken. Rule 33 provides that
" the court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required in the interest
of justice " D was found guilty by jury trial in a federal district court
for evasion of federal income taxes and sentenced to a prison term. Three,
days later D moved for a new trial. Motion demed. D appealed, alleging
mnter aia that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant
a new trial. The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision and
refused to grant a new trial. D was then incarcerated. Three days after ls
imprisonment, the district court reconsidered its decision and granted D's
original motion for a new trial. Writ of mandamus is now sought by the
United States to compel the district court to revoke its order for a new trial
and to enforce the mandate of the circuit court requiring execution of the
judgment and sentence. Held. That the trial court was acting within the
provision of Rule 33, that in the interest of justice the trial court may in
its discretion order a new trial, and such action is not mconsistent with or
prohibited by the circuit court's decision and mandate. United States v.
Smith, 156 F.(2d) 642 (1946). Affirmed.
Neither the federal statutes nor other rules relative to the granting of new
trials cast any light upon the power of the trial judge to reconsider his action
in denying or granting a. motion for a new trial. The weight of authority
favors the power of the trial court, in a criminal action, to reconsider its
rulings upon a motion for a new trial. Fine v. Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 252,
44 N.E.(2d) 659 (1942), 145 A. L. R. 392 (1942), People v. Beath, 277
Mich. 473, 269 N.W 238 (1936). Contra: State v. Duncan, 101 Wash. 522,
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172 Pac. 915 (1918). However, the cases so holding refer to a reconsideration
made przor to an appeal. Upon appeal, a trial court loses its jurisdiction until
the case is returned. Then it is bound to execute the mandate of the appellate
court. Tinkhoff v. United States, 86 F.(2d) 869 (1936), Simmons v. United
States, 89 F.(2d) 591, (1937), Flowers v. United States, 86 F.(2d) 79
(1936), 28 U S. C. A. § 25. An appellate court, upon appeal from an order
overruling a motion for a new trial, is restricted, when no questions of law are
involved, to inquiring whether the trial judge abused or failed to exercise his
discretion. Bratcker v. United States, 149 F.(2d) 742 (1942), Holgram v.
United States, 217 U S. 509, 521, 30 Sup. Ct. 588 (1909), Trial courts are
allowed a wide latitude of discretion in conducting a trial. United States v.
Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 247, 60 Sup. Ct. 811 (1940), United
States v. Meyer, 235 U S. 55, 35 Sup. Ct. 16 (1914). The majority opinion in
the instant case is that upon D's appeal, the Circuit Court decided only that
the trial judge was within the bounds of his discretion in denying the motion.
That decision did not determine that the trial judge could not, in the exercise
of his discretion, have properly granted the motion for a new trial. Conse-
quently, the decision and mandate of the circuit court did not prohibit the
district court from reconsidering its decision and from granting a new trial,
as prescribed by Rule 33.
The circuit court did not consider whether the lower court could have
acted on D's motion had it been made more than 5 days after verdict. Rule
33 provides that " a motion for a new trial based on any other grounds
(than newly discovered evidence) shall be made within 5 days after verdict
or within such time as the court may fix during the 5-day period." Most
similar state statutes have been strictly construed. State v. Hecker, 109 Ore.
520, 221 P 808 (1923), State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 172 P 234 (1918).
But to construe strictly the above time limitation would seem inconsistent
with the section of the rule which states that "a court may grant a new trial
to a defendant if required in the interest of justice." A decision on this point
will vitally affect the scope of Rule 33. It will also determine whether the
courts will follow the common law limitation that a trial court on granting a
new trial on its own motion can do so only within the time defendant could
properly have made his motion. As motion for a new trial was made within
5 days in the principal case, the question did not arise.
In the instant case, it would seem that the decision of the majority is a
sound rule, as it is in the interest of justice and does not violate the mandate
of the appellate court. Were the latter true, a contrary decision would seem
in order. J.C.B.
Jury-Special Vetre-Excuse of Previous Panel-Prejudicial
Effect. Prior to the prosecution of D for manslaughter and abortion the
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judge, on his own motion, ordered a special vemre to be summoned, and
excused the.regular panel for the forthcoming trial, because word of tamper-
ing with the regular panel in connection with that trial had come to his
attention. As a result, the jury was selected exclusively from the special
panel. Motions by D for a continuance and to quash the special venire were
demed. Affirming a judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court held. In the
absence of a showing of prejudice, the method used was "not inappropriate"
to the end of securing a fair and impartial trial. State v. Payne et al., 125
Wash. Dec. 383, 171 P.(2d) 277 (1946). Affirmed on rehearing, 126 Wash.
Dec. 730 (1947).
Although Washington stands with the majority of jurisdictions in con-
struing its jury statutes as directory only, lack of substantial compliance
raises a conclusive presumption of prejudice. Roche Fruit and Produce Co. V.
N P R. Co., 18 Wn.(2d) 484, 139 P.(2d) 714, 92 A. L. R. 1109 (1943),
State v. Rholeder, 82 Wash. 618, 144 Pac. 914 (1914). The court, in the
principal case, deemed the trial court's action to be substantial compliance
with our statutes, and seemed to base its holding upon the established prin-
ciple that a litigant has no vested right in a particular panel member, and so
a trial judge may excuse any member at his discretion and upon his own
motion. Rxi. Rzv. STAT. §§ 97-1, 100; State v. Guthrw, 185 Wash. 464,
56 P.(2d) 160 (1936), State v. Williams, 132 Wash. 40, 231 Pac. 21 (1924),
State v. Phillips, 65 Wash. 324, 118 Pac. 43 (1911). The calling of a special
venire to replace the regular panel at the trial court's discretion is common
in many states where such procedure is permitted by statute. Amos v. Super-
or Court, 196 Cal. 6,77, 239 Pac. 317 (1925), State v. Lightfoot, 118 Kan.
428, 235 Pac. 843 (1925), People v. Razzen, 120 Misc. Rep. 182, 197
N.Y. S. 784 (1923), Viley v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 395, 244 S.W 538
(1922). Idaho permits the use of special venires in place of the regular
panel, without the aid of statute; but the Idaho court is. forced to that
procedure by the infrequency of trials and the mconvemence of re-assembling
the regular panel. Ex .Parte Rash, 64 Ida. 521, 134 P.(2d) 420 (1943),
State v. Shelton, 46 Ida. 423, 267 Pac. 950 (1928).
The trial court's method of meeting suspected corruption of the jury
panel has little basis in statute or precedent in Washington. Washington
has provided for calling of a special vemre to supplement deficiencies which
may occur in the regular panel. Rzxi. R v. STAT. § 99. Decisions construing
and applying this statute have indicated strict adherence in permitting the
use of special venires only for the supplying of- additional jurors after the
regular panel has been exhausted. State v. Lasswell, 133 Wash. 428, 233
Pac. 928 (1925), State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 Pac. 251 (1906), Blan-
ton v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 Pac. 239 (1890). One Washington case,
cited by neither court nor counsel, has upheld the use of a special venire
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instead of the regular panel. However, there was no regular panel in attend-
ance, and the court expressly weakened its holding by stating that because
the proceeding was a summary one (mandamus), and the trial court's
verdict had been directed, there could be no prejudice State ex rel. King v.
Trimbell, 12 Wash. 440, 41 Pac. 183 (1895).
It is submitted that this decision will have greater effect than the court
may have anticipated when it dealt so briefly with appellant's contentions.
Not only is the holding an extremely liberal view of what constitutes sub-
stantial compliance, but it permits the trial judge to take an even more
active hand m the impaneling of the jury, with power to act ex mero motu
upon his own knowledge, suspicions, or fears. It may well be a step toward
special panels for all important -trials. C.J.N.
Evidence-Parol Evidence to Vary Writing-To Show Existence
of Condition. D, in an action for the balance due on a sale of strawberries,
set up an executed written contract as a defense. P testified that D's agent
had said at the time the contract was made: "If the OPA limits us to
twelve cents, that is what we will pay. If not, ths contract will not go into
effect and we will pay whatever other companies pay" (Italics added).
Other witnesses for P testified to the same effect. Verdict for D; P appeals.
The Supreme Court affirmed and further held that the trial court should
have sustained D's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and dismissed
P's suit. Mapes v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Corporation, 126 Wash. Dec.
114, 173 P.(2d) 182 (1946)
The court reasoned that the testimony as to price was madmssable under
the parol evidence rule. McDonald v. Wyant, 167 Wash. 49, 8 P.(2d) 428
(1932), Whitman Realty & Inv. Co. v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171
(1931), Bergman v. Evans, 92 Wash. 158, 158 Pac. 961 (1916). P main-
tamed that this case is within the "conditional delivery" exception to the
parol evidence rule: that parol evidence is admissible to show that a written
contract was not to be operative until the happening of an event. Walker v.
Copeland, 193 Wash. 1, 74 P.(2d) 469 (1937), Harrop v. Coffman-Dobson
Bank & Trust Company, 160 Wash. 449, 295 Pac. 165 (1931), Reiner v.
Crawford, 23 Wash. 669, 63 Pac. 516, 83 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1901).
The court recognized this exception to the parol evidence rule but denied
its applicability to this case. It stated that P's testimony was an attempt to
vary the terms of the written contract. A careful study of the offered testimony,
including the language quoted above, reveals no such attempt. P simply
testified that the contract was subject to a condition precedent: the retention
of the twelve-cent OPA price ceiling on strawberries. It would seem therefore
that P's testimony was clearly admissible under the "conditional delivery"
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exception to the parol evidence rule. RESTATEMLMNT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§ 241, 5 WIGmORm, EvDENCE § 2408 (2d ed. 1923). S.G.0.
Vendor and Purchaser-Condition Precedent-Vendor's Failure
to Furmsh Title Report. An earnest money receipt for purchase of real
estate provided that vendor was to furnisk a title report to purchaser within
30 days of the acceptance of the offer. Vendor's agent notified purchaser
within 30-day period that he (agent) had the title report, but he neglected
to make actual deliveiy to the purchaser. Held. the furnishing of the title
report was a condition precedent to the purchaser's liability on the contract;
furnish in this instance means actual delivery or tender of delivery to the
purchaser; the purchaser may cancel or withdraw from the contract and
recover the earnest money paid. Kolosoff v. Turi, 127 Wash. Dec. 76, -
P.(2d) - (1947).
This case was an en banc rehearing reversing a departmental opinion re-
ported in 125 Wash. Dec. 423, 171 P.(2d) 234 (1946), in which the court
held that making the title report available to the purchaser was a sufficient
furnishing; that consequently there had been no breach of contract and the
purchaser could not recover his earnest money
Whether or not "furmshing" title report requires actual delivery to the
purchaser is a question of first impression in this state. However, the court
relied for authority upon cases from a number of other jurisdictions holding
that a contract to furnish abstract of title to purchaser meant an actual
delivery of the abstract to the purchaser, the failure so to deliver justifying
the purchaser in terminating the contract. See note m 52 A. L. R. 1465, 1470.
It should be noted that under the business practice in this state, the title
report serves much the same purpose for the purchaser as does an abstract of
title, thus making those cases concerning abstracts in other jurisdictions good
authority in the instant case.
Even under the general rule noted above, it is still possible to mention the
procurance of abstract of title or title report and yet not have the delivery
of the document be a condition of the contract-thus a failure to deliver
would not constitute a breach of the contract. Paprn v. Goodrich, 103 IlM. 86
(1882). L.R.B.
Criminal Law-Constitutional and Statutory Provisions--Infor-
mation as to Right to Be Represented by Counsel. Upon arraignment
for a charge of attempted robbery, the judge asked defendant, a young sailor,
if he wished the court to appoint an attorney, to which defendant replied,
cc I guess it wouldn't hurt to have one." The next question brought out
the fact that he 'had no funds.to pay an attorney, and upon being asked if he
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wished to delay pleading "until an attorney has been appointed" he said,
"No, I'll plead guilty" Judgment was rendered and he was committed to
the state reformatory Subsequently, through efforts of his father, counsel
was consulted, and a motion was made upon his behalf to withdraw the plea
of guilty, upon grounds that he had not been properly advised of his rights
to counsel and that there was a valid defense which would have been apparent
to a lawyer. Upon hearing, defendant testified he didn't know what the judge
meant by "until an attorney has been appointed" (that the state would ap-
point one) and since he didn't want to be a burden Vpon his folks, he had
pleaded guilty The motion was denied. Appeal. Held. On the basis of the
record, the court had complied with the constitutional and statutory re-
quirements. State v. Cowan, 125 Wash. Dec. 322, - P (2d) - (1946).
In reaching its decision, the court in the principal case apparently followed
previous Washington interpretations of the rights of an accused to counsel.
State v. Scofield, 129 Wash. 295, 24 Pac. 941 (1924), State v. BaJoro, 146
Wash. 312, 262 Pac. 964 (1928) Although the result may have been correct,
the reasoning is not clear. In Washington a motion to withdraw a plea upon
the grounds of lack of advice as to rights to counsel would appear to involve
three separate and distinct rights of accused: (1) "In criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by coun-
sel." WAsH. CONST. Art. 1, § 22. The purpose of this provision is usually con-
sidered to be an abrogation of the old English rule which denied a person
charged with a felony the right to counsel, and thereby permits an accused
the benefit of counsel of his own choosing if he can provide the same.
(2) " And if it appear that he is unable to employ counsel, by reason of
poverty, counsel shall be assigned to him by the court." REm. REV STAT., §
2095. This provision is for the purpose of providing counsel without cost for
those accused of crime, who do not have financial means to secure counsel
for themselves, in order to eliminate any practice which subjects men to
increased dangers of conviction of crime merely because of poverty (3) The
right to withdraw a plea at the discretion of the trial court is provided in
REM. REv. STAT. §§ 2111 and 464 et. seq. See State v. McKeen, 186 Wash.
127, 56 P.(2d) 1026 (1936). Application and discussion of the doctrine of
discretion appears proper only where accused has not been denied any con-
stitutional or statutory right. Tipton v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. Rep. 56, 235
Pac. 259 (1925), 149 A. L. R. 1413 (1944).
When arraigned in a federal court upon a criminal charge, it is mandatory
that an accused be provided or have counsel, even though he pleads guilty,
unless the following provision of the Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Consti-
tution is waived: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Walker v. John-
ston, 312 U S. 275 (1941) The federal rule applicable to the waiver of this
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right has been laid down by the U. S. Supreme Court m the much-cited case
of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1937) Every reasonable presumption is
made against such a waiver, and whether there is a proper waiver should be
clearly determined by the trial court, and it is fitting and appropriate for that
determination to appear upon the record. The jurisdiction of a court may be
lost at the beginning of a trial due to failure to complete the court by provid-
ing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, and one thereafter
imprisoned through the void judgment of such court may obtain release by
habeas corpus. Failure to request, or indicate in any manner a desire that
counsel be assigned, does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right, for
the accused may not know of his constitutional right, and a waiver is ordi-
narily an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst,
supra, Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F Supp. 774 (1943), Evans v. Rives, 126
F.(2d) 633 (1942). A plea of guilty entered under a misapprehension of a
material fact, such as the right to assistance of counsel without cost to him-
self, cannot be considered a free and voluntary admission of guilt and a waiver
of all defenses. Dictum in Parker v. Johnston, 29 F Supp. 829 (1939) Such
a plea does not waive the constitutional guaranty of right to have counsel
appointed. Walker v. Johnston, supra, Evans v. Rives, mpra. See Glasser v.
U S., 315 U. S. 60 (1942) and annotations in 149 A. L. R. 1403 and 84 L.
ed. 383.
Regardless of the soundness of the reasoning behind it, the federal rule
cannot be enforced upon state courts since it has been held that the Sixth
Amendment is not binding upon state courts. Games v. State of Washington,
277 U. S. 81 (1928). However, the right to assistance of counsel is so funda-
mental that the failure by a state court to make an effective appointment of
counsel may amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the fol-
lowmg provision of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Powell v. Alabama, 297 U S. 45 (1932). A plea of guilty is not necessarily
a waiver of right to counsel under the due process clause. Rice v. Olson, 324
U. S. 786 (1945), House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945), Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U. S. 471 (1944), Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941). That the due
process clause does not require a state court to appoint counsel in every
instance is indicated by a case wherein denial of a state court to appoint
counsel for one accused of robbery, but who had experience in criminal court,
was upheld. Betts v. Brady, 316 U S. 455 (1941). (A note in this case con-
tams a useful tabulation of the pertinent statutes of each state.) A recent case
finding no lack of due process in failure to appoint counsel where one accused
of murder pleaded guilty, is Carter v. Illinois, 67 Sup. Ct. 216, decided in
December, 1946. Although a 5-4 decision, based on rather technical grounds,
this case appears to strengthen the holding in Betts v. Brady, supra, which had
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been looked upon with some question in view of the broad language in the
subsequent case of Williams v. Kaiser, supra, and changes in the personnel
of the court.
Since the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, the federal courts and several
state courts have revised their procedures and requirements in accordance
with the holding to provide a full and very complete statement to accused
(1) as to his right to counsel of his own choosing if he can so provide, and
(2) if financially unable, his right to have counsel appointed by the court
without cost, and to cause this information, together with the accused's
decision or action thereon to appear clearly in the record. Hawk v. Olson,
66 Sup. Ct. 116 (1945) (Nebraska case), White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760
(1945) (Illinois case), U S. v. Steese, 144 F.(2d) 439 (1944), C. 448 of
Wisconsin Laws of 1945, 357.26; State v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N. W
(2d) 540 (1946), People v. Foster, 59 N. Y. S.(2d) 477 (1945) R~m. REV.
STAT. § 2095 apparently contemplates a similar rule in Washington but the
principal case indicates that trial courts do not always follow such procedures
and the supreme court has not in this opinion taken any clear-cut position
to discourage the use of varied and indefinite practices which may tend to
endanger or put in question the constitutional and statutory rights of an
accused. It appears that the voluntary adoption by trial and appellate courts
of the rule suggested above would be commendable. H. H.
The Writ of Coram Nobis in Waslhngton. In 1941 P, a prisoner in
the state penitentiary, applied to the Superior Court of King County for a
writ of coram nobts. The application was denied on the basis of insufficient
facts to warrant the issuance of the writ. In 1945 P again applied for a writ
of coram nobis and was again denied relief. The trial court found that sub-
stantially the same questions were involved as in the previous application and
the matter was therefore res judicata. On appeal, held. It is not necessary to
decide if the trial court had the power to issue a writ of coram nobts; if it
did not, then the result reached was correct. If, on the other hand, it did have
the power, then it made a proper disposition of the application as the rule
of res judicata applies to an order denying an application for a writ of coram
nobis. State v. Mason, 125 Wash. Dec. 699, 172 P.(2d) 6- (1946).
This unusual writ has been defined by one writer substantially as follows:
The writ of coram nobs is a common law writ issuing out of a court of record
to review and correct a judgment of its own, relating to an error of fact
which does not appear on the record, and which, through no fault of the
petitioner, was not known by the court or by the petitioner at the time the
judgment was entered. Freedman, "The Writ of Coram Nobis" (1929), 3
Temple Law Quarterly, 365. The writ had fallen into disuse in Blackstone's
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time and is not mentioned in his Commentaries, but it still exists in the United
States and is used more and more frequently Mitchell v. State, 179 Miss.
814, 176 So. 743 (1937), Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Kan. 810, 168 S. W
(2d) 48 (1943). The writ has been held to lie on a showing that a plea of
guilty was entered for fear of mob violence. State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523,
32 Pac. 38 (1893). The writ was issued to revoke a sentence confining a
person under eighteen to the penitentiary in violation of statute. Ex parte
Gray, 77 Mo. 169 (1882). It was issued to revoke a sentence where the de-
fendant was insane at the time of trial and this fact was not known by the
court. Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517 (1880), contra: Withrow v. Smithson,
37 W Va. 757, 17 S. E. 316 (1893.). The writ will not lie for newly discovered
evidence. Fugate v. State, 85 Miss. 94, 37 So. 554 (1904). It will not lie for
reexamination of an issue determined in the original proceedings. Coppock v.
Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 N. W 382 (1920) For a comprehensive discussion
of the use of the writ throughout the United States see Freedman's article,
supra. J' I
Cases involving the writ of coram nobis have been before our supreme court
four times prior to the instant case: State ex rel. Davis v. Superior Court,
15 Wash. 339, 46 Pac. 399 (1896), State v. Armstrong, 41 Wash. 601, 84
Pac. 584 (1906), Wilson v. State, 87 Wash. 410, 90 Pac. 257 (1907),
Humphrey v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224 Pac. 937 (1924) In every case the
trial court denied the writ on the ground that the facts did not warrant its
issuance and its action was affirmed on appeal. In State ex rel. Davis v.
Superior Court, supra, the court, as in the present case, expressly refused to
decide whether the trial court had the power to issue the writ. The language
used in the three other cited cases implied that the writ exists. Whether the
writ of coram nobs actually is available in Washington is therefore an open
question. The power to grant such a writ is not expressly given by the con-
stitution in defining the jurisdiction of the superior court, WASH. CoNsT.
Art. IV, § 6. The inference arising from these cases is that it is probable that the
writ will be recognized, though, as in other jurisdictions, its use is very nar-
rowly limited. The probable position of the Washington court is expressed
by a dictum in State v. Armstrong, supra at page 584 "Under our statutes
and practice, it may be that occasion might arise where the writ of coram nobis
could be properly granted; but such occasions must be very rare, as pro-
vision is made to afford relief by other means in most cases." B. McV
